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RONALD M. TAMECKI, SR., 
 
       Appellant 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
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District Court Judge: James F. McClure, Jr. 
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Before: ALITO, RENDELL and DUHE,* Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed September 27, 2000) 
 
       FRANK E. GARRIGAN (Argued) 
       Garrigan & Rosini 
       112 East Independence Street 
       Shamokin, Pennsylvania 17872 
 
       Attorney for Appellant 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
* Honorable John M. Duhe Jr., United States Circuit Judge for the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting by 
designation. 
 
 
  
       LAWRENCE G. FRANK (Argued) 
       Law Office of Lawrence G. Frank 
       2023 North Second Street 
       Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17102 
 
       Attorney for Appellee 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
DUHE, Circuit Judge: 
 
We AFFIRM the decision of the district court affirming the 
bankruptcy court's dismissal of Ronald M. Tamecki's 
("Debtor") Chapter 7 petition. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Debtor filed for Chapter 7 protection seeking discharge of 
an approximately $35,000 credit card debt owed to MBNA 
America. He possesses only one substantial asset, his share 
of a tenancy by the entirety in his home, which he holds 
with his estranged wife. Debtor and his wife have accrued 
over $100,000 of equity in the home. 
 
The Tameckis had been separated for approximatelyfive 
years at the time Debtor filed for bankruptcy, and they 
have now been separated for more than seven years. Debtor 
and his wife live in different towns, and each lives with a 
significant other. Mrs. Tamecki filed for divorce in July 
1993 but, for unknown reasons, the action is still pending. 
The most recent trial date was continued either on joint 
motion of the parties or without objection by the Debtor. 
 
In his petition Debtor claimed an exemption under 
Section 522(b)(2)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code on his share of 
the home equity. See 11 U.S.C. S 522(b)(2)(B). The trustee 
in bankruptcy ("Trustee") challenged this election and 
sought dismissal of Debtor's petition for "lack of good faith" 
under Section 707(a) of the Code. See 11 U.S.C. S 707(a). 
According to Trustee, Debtor's divorce is "right around the 
corner"; and, thus, Debtor will soon be entitled to his 
unencumbered share of the dissolved tenancy by the 
entirety. The Trustee estimates that this would be 
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approximately $50,000, an amount sufficient to cover 
Debtor's obligations and still leave him with enough money 
for a "fresh start." Accordingly, the Trustee reasoned that 
Debtor acted in bad faith in filing his petition knowing that 
he would soon be in a position to repay his debts. The 
bankruptcy court found that Debtor had failed to prove his 
good faith in filing for bankruptcy and dismissed the 
Debtor's petition under Section 707(a). The district court 
affirmed. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Section 707(a) allows a bankruptcy court to dismiss a 
petition for cause if the petitioner fails to demonstrate his 
good faith in filing. See In re Zick, 931 F.2d 1124, 1126-27 
(6th Cir. 1991), In re Marks, 174 B.R. 37, 40 (E.D. Pa. 
1994). Although the Code does not define "good faith," 
courts in this circuit have uniformly held that"[a]t the very 
least, good faith requires a showing of honest intention." 
See Marks, 174 B.R. at 40. Courts have cautioned, 
however, that: 
 
       Dismissal based on lack of good faith . . . should be 
       confined carefully and is generally utilized only in 
       those egregious cases that entail concealed or 
       misrepresented assets and/or sources of income, lavish 
       lifestyles, and intention to avoid a large single debt 
       based upon conduct akin to fraud, misconduct or gross 
       negligence. 
 
Zick, 931 F.2d at 1129. Courts can determine good faith 
only on an ad hoc basis and must decide whether the 
petitioner has abused the provisions, purpose, or spirit of 
bankruptcy law. See Marks, 174 B.R. at 40. The parties 
agree that the decision to dismiss a petition for lack of good 
faith rests within the sound discretion of the bankruptcy 
court. See Zick, 931 F.2d at 1126, In re Atlas Supply Corp., 
857 F.2d 1061, 1063 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 
Once a party calls into question a petitioner's good faith, 
the burden shifts to the petitioner to prove his good faith. 
See Marks, 174 B.R. at 40 citing In re Sky Group Int'l, Inc., 
108 B.R. 86, 90 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989) ("Once the good 
faith issue is placed in question, the party bringing the 
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petition has the burden of proving that the petition was 
brought in good faith."). The bankruptcy court found that 
Debtor failed to meet this burden. We agree. 
 
Debtor testified that he accrued over $35,000 in debt at 
a time when he was earning less than one-tenth this 
amount. Debtor could point to no marked calamity or 
sudden loss of income that precipitated his need to accrue 
such a comparatively large consumer debt. Moreover, 
Debtor's testimony concerning the state of his marriage 
confirmed the Trustee's assertion that divorce and 
dissolution of the tenancy by the entirety were"right 
around the corner.1" The district court did not abuse its 
discretion in determining that together these facts are 
sufficient to shift the burden to Debtor to prove his good 
faith.2 
 
Debtor's response was three-fold: first, that the Trustee 
must prove "extreme misconduct"; second, that ability to 
repay is not, in and of itself, evidence of bad faith, see 
Marks, 174 B.R. at 41 and third; that he did no more than 
avail himself of a proper exception under the Code. While 
we agree with Debtor and the court in Zick that we should 
not lightly infer bad faith, Debtor's response is insufficient 
to carry his burden of proving good faith. Debtor proffered 
no evidence of good faith other than his testimony that he 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Tamecki's testimony confirms that he and his wife are estranged. They 
have been separated for seven years. They live in separate towns, each 
with a new significant other. A divorce proceeding has been pending 
since 1993. They have not sought counseling, nor is there any indication 
that either party has made overtures toward a reconciliation. No 
explanation for the delay in finalizing the divorce has been provided. 
Accordingly, we see no error in the bankruptcy court's apparent 
discounting of Tamecki's self-serving testimony that he would take his 
wife back "in a heartbeat." That may be true, but there is no evidence 
that her return is either imminent or likely. 
 
2. We do not suggest, as the Dissent indicates, that "consumer debtors 
[must] affirmatively demonstrate good faith absent any challenge," or 
that "dismissal is appropriate anytime the debtor fails to affirmatively 
demonstrate his good faith." We hold merely that in this case where the 
trustee has called into question debtor's good faith, and put on evidence 
sufficient to impugn that good faith, the burden then shifts to the debtor 
to prove his good faith. 
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accrued his debt for subsistence purposes, intended to 
repay the debt, and that he loved his wife and would take 
her back "in a heartbeat." The bankruptcy court chose to 
discount this self-serving testimony and instead relied upon 
evidence that Debtor acquired a comparatively large 
consumer debt just prior to filing for bankruptcy and 
during the pendency of his divorce. While Debtor is correct 
that ability to repay is not in and of itself sufficient proof of 
bad faith, both the reasonableness of his accrual of the 
debt and the timing of his filing, particularly in relation to 
the curious and unexplained circumstances relating to the 
divorce proceeding, were sufficiently questionable to 
warrant good faith scrutiny. Debtor's assertion that the 
Code permits him to take the entireties exemption simply 
begs the question and does not address whether he availed 
himself of that provision in good faith. Ultimately, we find 
no error in the bankruptcy court's ruling that Debtor failed 
to prove his good faith. 
 
AFFIRMED. 
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ALITO, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
 
I join the opinion of the Court, but I add a few words to 
clarify the narrow point of disagreement between the 
majority and the dissent. As I understand the position of 
our dissenting colleague, she agrees (a) that a Chapter 7 
consumer case may be dismissed for "bad faith" and (b) 
that, once a debtor's good faith is appropriately put at 
issue, it is the burden of the debtor to produce evidence of 
good faith. I do not understand the dissent to argue that in 
this case the debtor produced evidence of good faith, and 
thus the only apparent point of disagreement concerns the 
question whether, on the particular facts of this case, the 
debtor's good faith was sufficiently put at issue to require 
him to demonstrate good faith. 
 
The dissent apparently believes that, in order to put 
Tamecki's good faith at issue, it was incumbent upon the 
trustee to produce evidence that, among other things, there 
is no good reason for the unusual delay in the completion 
of the Tameckis' divorce proceeding. See Dissenting Opinion 
at 9 ("[T]he trustee offered no evidence that put Tamecki's 
good faith at issue. He only made bald allegations, without 
proffering any evidence about the timing of Tamecki's still 
unconsummated divorce. . . ."). But the trustee, who is 
obviously not a party to the divorce proceeding, is in a 
comparatively poor position to show the reason for the 
delay. The known facts about the divorce proceeding are 
sufficient to place upon the debtor the burden of explaining 
the reason for the delay, which has now reached seven 
years. It may be that there are entirely legitimate reasons 
for the delay. If so, it should have been easy for Tamecki to 
show what they were. But he made no effort to do so. 
 
Under the particular circumstances of this case-- which, 
contrary to the implication of the dissent, is not the average 
consumer bankruptcy case -- the bankruptcy judge did not 
commit an abuse of discretion is dismissing the petition. 
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
Some background is necessary to understand the 
framework in which we analyze this dispute and why I 
strenuously disagree with the outcome in this case, the 
reasoning, and the rule implicitly set forth by the majority. 
The Bankruptcy Code contains no explicit good faithfiling 
requirement.1 It does, however, permit the court to dismiss 
cases, including chapter 7 consumer cases, "for cause." See 
11 U.S.C. SS 707(a), 930(a), 1112(b), 1208(c), 1307(c). We 
have not previously addressed the question of whether lack 
of good faith is grounds for dismissal of chapter 7 
consumer bankruptcy cases under section 707(a), nor have 
we established how to go about determining bad faith in 
such a context.2 Only two other courts of appeals have 
squarely confronted the question of bad faith dismissal of a 
consumer bankruptcy case under section 707(a). Both have 
held that bad faith may be grounds for dismissal under 
that provision, but have narrowly construed bad faith, 
finding that cases should be dismissed under only very 
limited circumstances in which the bankruptcy court has 
made specific findings of egregious behavior or misconduct. 
See Huckfeldt v. Huckfeldt (In re Huckfeldt), 39 F.3d 829, 
832 (8th Cir. 1994); Industrial Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Zick (In re 
Zick), 931 F.2d 1124, 1129 (6th Cir. 1991). Both in and 
outside of these two circuits, bankruptcy and district courts 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The one exception is in chapter 9, which governs bankruptcies by 
municipalities and contains an express good faithfiling requirement. See 
11 U.S.C. S 921(c). The Bankruptcy Code does require that repayment or 
reorganization plans -- as opposed to bankruptcy cases themselves -- be 
proposed in good faith. See 11 U.S.C. SS 1129(a)(3), 1225(a)(3), 
1325(a)(3). 
 
2. Although we have not ruled on the use of section 707(a) to dismiss 
cases "for cause" on account of bad faith, we recently have held, in the 
context of a sophisticated corporate debtor in chapter 11, that lack of 
good faith can be grounds for dismissal "for cause" under section 1112. 
See In re SGL Carbon Corp., 200 F.3d 154, 161 (3d Cir. 1999). We also 
stated in a footnote in SGL that "once at issue, the burden falls upon the 
bankruptcy petitioner to establish that the petition has been filed in 
`good faith.' " Id. at n.10. However, even if this statement were to be 
extended to chapter 7 consumer cases, as we discuss later, and as 
distinguished from the situation in SGL, nothing in the record of this 
case puts Tamecki's good faith "at issue." 
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have reserved bad faith dismissal for the truly egregious 
case, often involving individuals with substantial means 
who have flaunted their wealth, have continued their lavish 
lifestyles, and are engaging in creative, elaborate schemes 
to conceal their assets and cheat their creditors or to 
otherwise inflict harm on third parties.3 Indeed, because the 
standards for finding bad faith have been set so high by the 
federal courts, cases involving conduct that might appear 
questionable are nonetheless not dismissed due to the lack 
of actual evidence of bad faith or misconduct. See, e.g., In 
re Marks, 174 B.R. 37, 40 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (explaining, in 
upholding the bankruptcy court's decision not to dismiss 
the case, that "[t]he bankruptcy court stated that the record 
did not establish any unexplained transfer of assets, 
multiple case filings, extraordinary procedural gymnastics, 
or lack of candor and completeness in the debtor's 
statements and schedules.").4 With that background, I now 
turn to the facts of this case. 
 
In nearly all respects, Tamecki fits the profile of the 
average consumer debtor. He has marital problems, health 
problems, and employment problems. He has a large credit 
card debt that he incurred for subsistence purposes by 
using unsolicited "live checks" that MBNA sent to him while 
he was experiencing a lull in income and ability to perform 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. See, e.g., In re Lacrosse , 244 B.R. 583, 588-589 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 
1999) (dismissing case of debtor with 58 credit cards and over $500,000 
of consumer debt, who lived a lavish lifestyle and drove luxury cars, and 
who also falsely enticed clients to give him money by saying that he 
intended to make tax-free investments); In re Brown, 88 B.R. 280, 284- 
285 (Bankr. D. Hawaii 1988) (dismissing case of successful 
ophthalmologist who engaged in prebankruptcy asset planning to remove 
more than $700,000 from the reach of creditors and who sought to avoid 
an obligation to a recipient of cataract surgery who lost all vision in 
her 
right eye). 
 
4. The Court in Marks continued by explaining that "[m]ost instances of 
dismissal for bad faith under S 707(a) involve concealment, 
misrepresentation, or unexplained transfers to place assets beyond the 
reach of creditors." Id. at 41. Thus, even the cases of debtors that 
appear 
not to need bankruptcy relief have not been dismissed for bad faith in 
the absence of evidence of misconduct. See, e.g., In re Josey, 169 B.R. 
138, 140 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1994); In re Bridges , 135 B.R. 36, 38 (Bankr. 
E.D. Ky. 1991). 
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construction work due to his health and employment 
problems. He has an even lower income (under $4,000 per 
year in 1996 and 1997) than most debtors. He also has 
equity in a home held in tenancy by the entirety with his 
estranged wife that, under Pennsylvania law, cannot be 
touched by his creditors, either in or out of bankruptcy 
unless or until the tenancy is broken. However, far from the 
anecdotes of debtors who buy real estate to convert cash 
into exempt home equity in contemplation of bankruptcy, 
Tamecki and his wife have owned the house for many 
years; indeed, Tamecki built the house himself. Tamecki 
therefore has none of the obvious badges of bad faith as 
gleaned from the other cases. 
 
One would expect, therefore, that this case was 
dismissed for bad faith because the trustee put forth 
evidence of some type of misconduct or fraud. However, the 
trustee offered no evidence that put Tamecki's good faith at 
issue. He only made bald allegations, without proffering any 
evidence, about the timing of Tamecki's still- 
unconsummated divorce and his accrual of debt to MBNA, 
to which Tamecki provided responses that were not 
discredited by the Bankruptcy Court. The trustee, who is 
the primary advocate of dismissing Tamecki's case, 
conceded at oral argument that even after conducting 
considerable research, he knows of no case with an 
analogous fact pattern or remotely on point; he could not 
name one. Having canvassed the landscape, I have not 
found a case bearing any resemblance to this one in which 
bad faith was found to exist. Simply put, our ruling breaks 
new ground in the law regarding good faith filing. 
 
In dismissing Tamecki's case, the Bankruptcy Court 
made no specific findings of bad faith. However, in 
upholding the dismissal of Tamecki's case, the majority 
focuses on Tamecki's accrual of debt to MBNA and his 
pending divorce, both of which I will discuss in turn. 
 
Tamecki accrued most of his debt to MBNA within the 
two years prior to filing for bankruptcy. In addressing this 
accrual of debt, the Bankruptcy Court made no finding that 
Tamecki ran up his debts in contemplation of bankruptcy 
or made extravagant purchases in reckless disregard of his 
financial situation. To the contrary, the Bankruptcy Court 
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credited Tamecki's testimony that he incurred this debt to 
supplement his paltry income for food and other 
necessities. It is difficult to contemplate what more Tamecki 
could have done to refute any inference of bad faith from 
his use of the unsolicited live checks for subsistence at a 
time when he had nominal income. If the existence of a 
large credit card debt, unaccompanied by any evidence that 
the debtor incurred the debt without the intent to repay,5 is 
sufficient for bad faith dismissal, the bankruptcy courts 
and the majority of debtors in our circuit should be 
prepared for an onslaught of good faith challenges. 
 
The majority ruling also relies on Tamecki's still- 
unconsummated divorce proceedings. Tamecki's wifefiled 
for divorce more than five years prior to the bankruptcy 
filing, but the proceedings have been dormant for much of 
that time. Tamecki claims he would never divorce his wife 
of his own accord; he testified that he wants to remain 
married to her. The trustee opined, with no evidence, that 
Tamecki's divorce is "right around the corner," in which 
event he could be forced to sell his home, break the 
tenancy by the entirety protected by Pennsylvania law, and 
pay MBNA what he owes. I might find this contention 
persuasive if the trustee had offered any specific evidence, 
and the Bankruptcy Court had specifically found, that 
Tamecki had timed his bankruptcy and divorce to defraud 
his creditors. However, the Bankruptcy Court made no 
such finding, nor did it indicate that the possibility of 
Tamecki's divorce played any role in its ruling. In fact, the 
Court never shared its view on this issue; it did not 
explicitly accept the trustee's argument in this regard, nor 
did it discredit Tamecki's assertion that he did not want to 
be divorced from his wife (and therefore had no intention to 
break the tenancy by the entirety on his own accord).6 The 
majority takes a quantum and unprecedented leap by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The Bankruptcy Code contains a provision, section 523(a), under 
which creditors can challenge the dischargeability of specific debts. If 
there was any question that Tamecki incurred the debt without the 
intent to pay it, MBNA could have pursued its rights under that 
provision. 
6. The majority's reference to the Bankruptcy Court's assessment of the 
testimony regarding the marital status as "apparent discounting of 
Tamecki's self-serving testimony" is curious in light of the Bankruptcy 
Court's lack of any reference whatsoever to any concern regarding the 
marital situation. As noted above, the Bankruptcy Court does not even 
refer to the timing of the divorce as having any bearing on its decision 
or the outcome. 
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crediting the trustee's argument and using it as a basis for 
upholding the dismissal of Tamecki's case. 
 
A closer look at the trustee's argument reveals its 
slippery slope. Failing to put forth any evidence that 
Tamecki has schemed with his wife to postpone the divorce 
for their mutual benefit, the trustee's position on the 
divorce issue, as clarified in oral argument, is that Tamecki 
had an obligation "to move his divorce along" before filing 
for bankruptcy so that the state-law-protected tenancy by 
the entirety would be broken to make his home equity 
available for creditors, regardless of whether Tamecki 
actually wants to save his marriage.7 In addition to being 
concerned about the result in the case before us, I am 
concerned that by endorsing this argument, the majority is 
announcing an unprecedented rule that insolvent 
individuals must refrain from filing for bankruptcy if they 
may have more assets in the future, such that filing before 
realization of such assets, even absent proof of bad intent, 
is grounds for dismissal of one's bankruptcy case. For 
example, is an insolvent individual barred fromfiling for 
bankruptcy if his wealthy parent is ill, absent any evidence 
that he is timing his filing so as to deprive creditors of his 
potential inheritance? I submit that there is no such 
restriction in the Bankruptcy Code, and the courts should 
not create one. 
 
I will refrain from refuting a variety of specific statements 
made by the majority, with one exception, namely, its 
assertion that a court may dismiss a chapter 7 case for 
cause if the debtor fails to demonstrate good faith in filing, 
citing the Zick decision. Zick does not require consumer 
debtors to affirmatively demonstrate good faith absent any 
challenge. Zick says that lack of good faith may be a valid 
basis for dismissing a bankruptcy case for cause under 
section 707(a), see Zick, 931 F.2d at 1126, not that 
dismissal is appropriate anytime the debtor fails to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The trustee's alternative position at oral argument was that if Tamecki 
and his wife get back together, they should be required to take a second 
mortgage on their home to pay the MBNA debt. Regardless of the relative 
merits of this argument as a policy matter, it has no foundation in 
current bankruptcy law. 
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affirmatively demonstrate his good faith.8 Even if the 
burden shifts to a consumer chapter 7 debtor to defend his 
good faith after good faith has been put "at issue," I would 
submit that placing good faith at issue requires more than 
an unsupported hypothesis about the state of Tamecki's 
relationship with his estranged wife and pointing to a 
specific credit card debt in the bankruptcy schedules. I 
frankly find it untenable that an entirely unsupported 
assertion can trigger an obligation on the part of a debtor 
to affirmatively prove his good faith or lose all entitlement 
to bankruptcy relief. Such a procedure would be contrary to 
that employed by our sister courts of appeals, and 
constitutes an unwarranted departure from existing law. 
 
I respectfully dissent. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The Huckfeldt decision from the Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit also makes no mention of placing the burden of proving good 
faith on the debtor, taking only the cautious step that a specific finding 
of bad faith may be grounds for section 707(a) dismissal. 
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